Dimensions of Polarization in Turkey 2020 Survey

Key Findings

Following the first round carried in 2015 and the second round in 2017, the third round of the Dimensions of Polarization in Turkey was completed in November-December 2020. Coinciding with historical breaking points like the 15 July 2016 Coup Attempt, the Referendum of 16 April 2017 and the Elections of 24 June 2018, Dimensions of Polarization in Turkey this time was conducted in 2020 when the Coronavirus pandemic impacted upon our lives. At a time with such a scale of political, economic, and social fluctuations, the survey provides a detailed picture of how Turkish citizens see each other and politics.

The field study for the Dimensions of Polarization in Turkey 2020 was carried out when the daily new cases of Coronavirus was on the rise again and many restrictions were in place. This study, which was performed through face-to-face interviews with 4006 respondents representing the electorate population of Turkey at 500 sample points in 29 provinces selected through multistage sampling and with due diligence considerations for the Coronavirus measures, constitutes one of the most comprehensive field studies in terms of its methodology. The fact that this study was carried out with such a large sample and on such an extensive geography only contributes to the reliability and validity of the survey findings.

Beyond providing a portrayal of the current situation of political polarization in Turkey, the Dimensions of Polarization in Turkey 2020 serves as one of the most important inputs for the Strategies and Tools for Mitigating Polarization in Turkey (TurkuazLab.org), which is an intervention program aiming to tackle this phenomenon which hampers our ability to coexist and renders our democracy fragile. Further tools for mitigating polarization to be developed using the findings of this survey, which was conducted with the partnership of The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and İstanbul Bilgi University Center for Migration Research (BİLGİ-Migration) and through the financial support of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), will soon be shared publicly.

Following is a summary of the key findings of the survey:

Each Party Supporter Has an “Other” Party Supporter of Their Own!

34% of the survey respondents felt themselves “close” to AK Party supporters, 22% to CHP supporters, %11 to MHP supporters, %9 to HDP supporters and 9% to İYİ Party supporters. When asked about the political party supporters they feel most distant from, the rate of those who felt themselves most distant to HDP supporters was 40%, with AK Party supporters following behind.
with 23% and the CHP supporters with 14%. The percentage of those who felt most distant to MHP supporters was 8%.

Looking at the results of the previous surveys, we see yet again that supporters of HDP came first in the ranking of supporters “felt the most distant to”. However, whereas this rate was 55% in 2015 and 53% in 2017, it dropped down to 40% in 2020. Even though further and more detailed studies are needed to understand this decrease, it can be said at a first glance that it is caused by the political climate of the country rendering HDP and its supporters invisible. On the other hand, while there was a five-point decrease in the rate of those who see AK Party supporters as “others”, the same rate increased by six-points for CHP supporters. No striking change was observed for the supporters of the two other parties. The fact that a change, which was not seen between 2015 and 2017, occurred in 2020 leads to the conclusion that the political environment in the country is more influential in this period.

Looking at the relations between the supporters of political parties, it was revealed that each party supporter has an “other” party supporter of their own. The most distant political party supporters for AK Party supporters were HDP and CHP supporters; for CHP supporters, they were AK Party and HDP supporters, for HDP supporters, AK Party and MHP supporters, for İYİ Party supporters, AK Party and HDP supporters and for MHP supporters, HDP and CHP supporters.

Three Pillars of Emotional Political Polarization: Social Distance, Moral Superiority and Political Intolerance

The findings of the survey should also be elaborated in terms of emotional political polarization, the focal point of the study. The research team evaluates emotional political polarization, which it describes as supporters of different political parties disliking and feeling emotionally distant to each other, on three pillars: the social distance between the political party supporters, the moral superiority felt by the political party supporters, and the political intolerance directed towards the supporters of other political parties. These three directly interrelated criteria serve as the three pillars of emotional political polarization.

Let us remind that the concept of social distance, which took on a positive meaning within the context of the Coronavirus pandemic, actually reflects a desire to not interact directly with individuals from different groups and implies negativity. This scale developed by Emory S. Bogardus, an American sociologist, in 1925 has been used for quite some time as a criterion showing the desire of various groups to stay away from another group. Findings of the Dimensions of Polarization in Turkey 2020 showed that:

- 75% of the respondents did not want their child to marry a supporter of the political party which they feel “the most distant to”;
- 72% of the respondents did not want to do business with a supporter of the political party which they feel “the most distant to”;

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- 72% of the respondents did not want to do business with a supporter of the political party which they feel “the most distant to”;
• 67% of the respondents did not want their children to play with the children of the political party supporters which they feel “the most distant to”,
• 61% of the respondents did not want to be neighbors with the supporters of political parties which they feel “the most distant to”.

These high rates reveal that the desire to coexist in our country is low.

Another criterion utilized for emotional political polarization is the “moral” superiority felt towards the supporters of other political parties. The perception that the members belonging to a particular group are morally superior to the members of another group is both an indicator and a consequence of political polarization. According to the research study:

• Supporters of political parties attributed the positive adjectives such as patriotic (87%), working to the benefit of the country (%86), honorable (85%), open minded (84%), smart (83%) and generous (80%) to the supporters of their party,
• Whereas they described the “most distant to” party supporters as hypocrite (86%), selfish (85%), arrogant (82%), cruel (79%), threat to the country (78%) and bigoted (77%).

Although, the respondents were presented with “none” or “both” as response options, a very small number selected these responses - another issue that needs to be addressed.

Depriving the “other” party supporters of some freedoms which are seen as rights for their own demonstrates how political polarization may transform into “othering”. A person’s failure to see others as their equal due to their political party preferences is one of the most significant threats to democracy. According to survey results:

• 41% of the respondents objected the supporters of the political party which they felt “the most distant to” organizing a rally in their city,
• 37% of the respondents objected the supporters of the political party which they felt “the most distant to” making a press release,
• 37% of the respondents objected the supporters of the political party which they felt “the most distant to” being able to organize a meeting in their city,
• 35% of the respondents objected the supporters of the political party which they felt “the most distant to” being able to get education in accordance with their needs,
• 34% of the respondents objected the supporters of the political party which they felt “the most distant to” becoming candidates for undertaking political roles.

On the other hand, the percentage of those who gave consent to phone tapping of the supporters of the political party which they felt “the most distant to” (48%) reveals how widespread political intolerance towards the supporters of other political parties is.

As supporters of all political parties demonstrated social distance, moral superiority, and political intolerance towards the political party supporters they feel most distant to, we can say that emotional
political polarization is not driven by the supporters of a specific political party but can be observed among the supporters of all political parties.

**Political Party Preferences Overlap with the Identities**

One of the most important reasons behind emotional political polarization is the overlapping of the identity which the persons feel they belong to with their political party preferences and the latter turning into a supra-identity. The research study points out to the existence of a correspondence between identities and supporters of political parties in Turkey.

There may be several identity groups which individuals may affiliate themselves with. How the identities are attained is shaped by a series of socialization tools ranging from the family to the media. However, the political and social conditions of the moment determine which identity will be predominant. According to the research study, being a Turk was the most important identity for 18% of the respondents. This was followed by being a Kemalist with 11%, being Conservative with 10%, being “educated” with 10% and being a Kurd with 10%. Whereas being Religious (8%) and Nationalist (8%) were at a relatively lower rate, being Modern (6%), Ultranationalist (3%) and Secularist were mentioned by a very small number of people as their primary identity.

When we examined the identities that the political party supporters highlight, we observed that:

- Supporters of AK Party identified themselves more with Religious people and Conservatives,
- Supporters of MHP identified themselves more with Nationalists and Ultranationalists,
- Supporters of İYİ Party identified themselves more with Educated people and Modern people,
- Supporters of CHP identified themselves more with Kemalists, Secularists and Alawites,
- Supporters of HDP identified themselves more with Kurds.

The perceived level of “superiority” of one’s own group in the society lies among the factors that determine the relations between the political party supporters.

- **AK Party and MHP supporters generally perceived their groups as superior to other groups.** They believed that the government respected their groups more, that people in their groups became more respected in the society in the last five years and that other people envy the people in their group. They agreed with the view that people in their group had a better financial situation and enjoyed an increase in employment opportunities in the last five years.  
- **HDP supporters generally constituted the group with the least claims of superiority.** The percentage of those who agreed with views such as being heard, being respected in the society, and having better financial situation and employment opportunities remained at around 15%. 53% of HDP supporters believe that people in their group have no power in Turkey.
- **The percentage of those who believed they were socially superior in some respects among İYİ Party and CHP supporters varied between 30% to 40%.** 36% of CHP supporters expressed the view that their group held no power in the society.
As much as social superiority, social exclusion is also a factor that enables political party identities to be reinforced. The research study shows that certain identity groups are systematically faced with discrimination and exclusion.

- Among HDP supporters, 55% state that they received a “worse” treatment than others in job applications, 54% at police stations, 50% at government offices, 40% at universities, 38% at hospitals, 38% in luxurious shops and 32% on the streets.
- The venues where CHP supporters stated that they received a relatively “worse” treatment than others were job applications (22%), police stations (18%), and government offices (17%).
- 13% of İYİ Party supporters felt that they received a “worse” treatment than other groups in job applications.
- The percentage of AK Party and MHP supporters who thought they received worse treatment than other groups in the mentioned venues was negligible.

Another situation where political polarization becomes evident is when the opinions on the topics discussed in Turkey are formed in line with the political party affiliations and the discussions lean towards the stance of the political party leadership instead of the positive or negative aspects of the topics. Nowadays, we see a common partisan approach in many topics discussed in the public arena.

- 86% of AK Party supporters and 82% of MHP supporters were in favor of the decision to transform the Hagia Sophia Museum into a mosque. Approval rate was 34% among CHP supporters.
- The approval rate for the construction of the Canal İstanbul was 66% among AK Party supporters and 57% among MHP supporters. For the supporters of CHP, İYİ Party and HDP approval rate remained below 15%.
- The percentage of those who argued that people who have another mother tongue than Turkish should be able to receive education in their own mother tongue was 91% among HDP supporters. Whereas this percentage was around 30% among the supporters of AK Party, CHP and İYİ Party, 21% of MHP supporters were in favor of this opinion.

The survey results also suggest that the political and social developments arouse different emotions among different party supporters.

- While revenue guarantees given to companies that build bridges and highways caused negative feelings among CHP supporters (84%), İYİ Party supporters (79%) and HDP supporters (70%), the negative feelings rate remained at 44% for AK Party supporters and 39% for MHP supporters.
- When asked about the dismissal of some mayors and appointment of trustees to replace them, 90% of HDP supporters held negative feelings. This rate was 80% for CHP supporters and 61% for İYİ Party supporters. 27% of AK Party supporters and 20% of MHP supporters had negative feelings in this regard.
67% of CHP supporters, 61% of HDP supporters and 59% of İYİ Party supporters had negative feelings about Turkey's military presence in Libya. This rate was 27% among AK Party supporters and 19% among MHP supporters.

“Justice” March by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu gave way to negative feelings among AK Party (65%) and MHP (47%) supporters while it sparked mostly positive feelings among the other political party supporters.

Ekrem İmamoğlu’s election as Mayor of Istanbul caused negative feelings among AK Party (67%) and MHP (40%) supporters whereas negative feelings were not common, to the contrary positive feelings were observed among the other political party supporters.

Turkey's discovery of natural gas in the Black Sea caused positive feelings in the supporters of all political parties in general.

52% of the respondents believed that differences of opinion in Turkey increased compared to past, while 42% thought that differences of opinion had existed in the past at similar rates. The survey findings suggest that:

- The view that differences of opinion existed in the past was commonly accepted by AK Party (60%) and MHP (61%) supporters.
- On the other hand, supporters of CHP (70%), HDP (67%) and İYİ Party (65%) thought that nowadays differences of opinion were more apparent.

The events that led to the greatest divergence of opinion in Turkey were ranked as follows: 15 July 2016 Coup Attempt (34%), the Kurdish Problem (32%), transition to Presidential Government System (30%) and Gezi protests (32%).

Echo Chambers and Spiral of Silence Are Common Both in Traditional Media and the Social Media

One of the most significant determinants of emotional political polarization is the formation of Echo Chambers, where individuals only get information from sources that reflect and reinforce their own opinion rather than different channels. On the other hand, when individuals who feel their opinions are in the minority remain silent and different opinions are no more heard, Spiral of Silence is formed. Individuals who do not encounter with different opinions and abstain from voicing their own opinions possess a uniform worldview and have a tendency to perceive opinions that are different from their own as wrong/perverse.

- 70% of the respondents stated that they agreed with their close circles on political issues and 70% stated that their relations with their close circles did not deteriorate due to their political opinions.
- When asked about joining a discussion on the “Government's judicial practices”, which is a sensitive subject, 50% of the respondents stated that they would join the discussion at a family dinner at home. This percentage stayed the same when having a dinner outside with friends.
• The percentage of those who stated that they would join the discussion at a neighborhood meeting was 38% whereas the percentage of those who would join at the workplace/school was 30%.
• The low rates among those who stated they would join the discussion on Facebook (22%) and Twitter (19%) point out to the presence of the Spirals of Silence on social media.
• 80% of the respondents stated that their partners, families, and close friends would share the same opinion on this matter.
• The percentage of those who stated that their friends at the workplace/school shared the same opinion with their own was 45%. Likewise, the percentage of those stating that their neighbors (46%) and people they follow on Facebook (40%) would have the same opinion was also high.

Even though television and smart phones are the information channels through which individuals receive information most frequently (74% and 69% respectively), conversations with friends are also among the foremost information sources (57%). Online news portals (57%) and Facebook and Twitter (36%) are also among the primary information sources. It seems that newspapers and radio have lost their importance as news sources.

One of the most significant indicators of the phenomenon of Echo Chambers is the variations in the news sources for different political party supporters. The research study also presents some findings which validate this:

• Supporters of AK Party stated that they watched Kanal 7, A Haber and ATV prime news more often,
• Supporters of CHP stated that they watched FOX TV and Halk TV more often,
• Supporters of MHP state that they watched TRT1 more often when compared with the supporters of other parties.

Being imposed to different sources makes individuals believe that the sources they follow are more “unbiased”:

• Supporters of AK Party and MHP perceived ATV, A Haber, TRT1, Sabah and Hürriyet as unbiased news channels,
• Supporters of CHP perceived Cumhuriyet, Sözcü and Halk TV as unbiased news channels,
• Supporters of HDP perceived Halk TV and FOX TV as unbiased news channels.

One of the factors which create emotional political polarization is not only that individuals receive information within Echo Chambers where they only find a reflection of their own opinions, but also their value judgments on the quality of the information they receive. 60% of the respondents stated that they came across with at least one type of misinformation/Fake News. However, there are significant differences between supporters of political parties as to which information sources propagate more misinformation/Fake News.
• 25% of CHP supporters stated they came across with misinformation in the social media tools used by those supporting government, such as Facebook and Twitter. This rate was 20% among supporters of İYİ Party and HDP.
• 24% of CHP supporters, 23% of HDP supporters and 21% of İYİ Party supporters stated they came across with misinformation in pro-government TV channels and newspapers.
• 23% of AK Party supporters and 20% of MHP supporters stated they came across with misinformation in the social media tools used by those supporting the opposition.
• 19% of AK Party and 10% of MHP supporters stated they came across with misinformation in pro-opposition TV channels and newspapers.
• Whereas 28% of İYİ Party supporters and 27% of MHP supporters stated they came across with Fake News in every channel, the percentage of AK Party, CHP and HDP supporters who provided the same response was around 20%.

Social media channels fail to provide a solution to the issue of Echo Chambers. Of the respondents, 10% of those who have a Twitter account and 7% of those who have a Facebook account state that they use the two social media channels frequently to share their views on political issues. On the other hand, 78% of Twitter users and 74% of Facebook users stating that their friends and the people they follow on these social media channels have political opinions that fit their own demonstrates that the Social Media itself forms a sort of Echo Chamber.

Though They Live in Different Worlds, Different Party Supporters Unify over Anxiety

It is possible to spot the differentiation among the reality perceptions of individuals when they obtain information from limited sources and do not get out of their Echo Chambers where no minority voices but only their voices are heard. Yet, the survey findings point out to a high level of anxiety commonly shared over many issues. As one would expect, “An earthquake with a serious damage and high number of casualties in Turkey” (94%) and “Pandemics” (93%) were among the concerns shared by all party supporters. Similarly, “economic crisis”, “s/he or a family member becoming unemployed”, “his/her children not being able to receive the education they deserve” and “terrorist attack” reflect the common concern with a percentage of 90%. Other concerns mentioned were “Limiting of the freedom of expression” and “ending the independence of the courts” (87%) followed with “War in the Middle East or Caucasus involving several countries” (85%). The differences among the political party supporters come to surface when the percentages tend to decrease. For instance, while 77% of the AK Party supporters expressed concern over “ending the independence of the courts”, the percentage among the CHP, HDP and İYİ Party supporters were 92%.

Unemployment (50%), price increases (47%) and the Coronavirus pandemic (27%) were perceived as the main problems of the country. However, divergence of opinion also exists among the different political party supporters in this regard.
Almost all of the party supporters stated unemployment and price increases with similar frequencies. AK Party supporters mentioned the Coronavirus pandemic and terrorism more frequently compared to the other subjects.

Syrian refugees, problems of women/youth, education and politicians were more among the main problems for İYİ Party supporters.

CHP supporters focused more on unemployment and price increases as well as poverty.

The Southeastern/Kurdish Question was seen as a prominent problem among HDP supporters.

Having different worldviews also cause differentiation in perceptions among the different party supporters on economic issues which are normally believed to be objective:

- 57% of AK Party supporters and 37% of MHP supporters thought that the country was on the right track. Meanwhile, this percentage was 5% among HDP supporters and 10% among CHP supporters.
- For 29% of AK Party supporters, the financial situation of the country and for 27% of AK Party supporters the financial situation of their families was better off when compared to 5 years ago. Meanwhile, this rate was within 4-5% for the supporters of CHP, İYİ Party and HDP.
- Considering the next year, 44% of AK Party supporters thought the economic situation of our country and 39% of the same group thought the financial situation of their families would be better. Meanwhile, this optimism was around 6-7% among CHP, İYİ Party and HDP supporters.
- 18% of MHP supporters stated that the financial situation of the country and their families was better when compared to 5 years ago; 23% of them thought that the economic situation of the country and the family would improve in the coming year.

There are considerable differences of opinion among the party supporters on basic political issues:

- 71% of AK Party supporters and 51% of MHP supporters thought that the checks by the opposition parties slowed down the functioning of the government. 91% of CHP supporters, 82% of HDP supporters and 87% of İYİ Party supporters argued that the government must be checked by the other parties.
- 76% of AK Party supporters and 53% of MHP supporters believed that the presidential system of government was better for the future of our country. Meanwhile, 90% of CHP supporters, 77% of HDP supporters and 81% of İYİ Party supporters disagreed.
- While 78% of AK Party supporters and 76% of MHP supporters believed that the Gezi protests were supported by foreign powers, 75% of CHP supporters defined the protests as peaceful acts.
- 77% of AK Party supporters and 60% of MHP supporters believed that the elections in Turkey were held in a free and fair environment. 90% of HDP supporters, 80% of CHP supporters and 69% of İYİ Party supporters disagree.
- When it comes to the representation of these political views in the governance, 80% of AK Party supporters and 63% of MHP supporters agreed that their views were reflected in the
way it should be. The disapproval rate among HDP, CHP and İYİ Party supporters was 88%, 82% and 70%, respectively.

**Widespread Convergence on Violence against Women, Divergence on Who is Responsible**

Half of the respondents stated that they were unaware of the discussions on the Istanbul Convention that occupied the agenda last summer. This rate varied from 35% for CHP supporters to 50% for AK Party supporters.

When a definition was given on the content of the Istanbul Convention and when asked whether they agreed with the view that violence against women would increase if the signature is withdrawn from this agreement:

- While 37% of AK Party supporters could not/did not respond to this question, 32% of them responded as “it will have no impact”.
- 62% of CHP supporters and 60% of İYİ Party supporters believed that violence against women would increase. 20% of both party supporters preferred not to answer.
- While 32% of MHP supporters did not express any opinion, 33% of them believed that it would not have any impact.
- The percentage of those who did not express an opinion among HDP supporters was 28%. 48% believed that the violence against women would increase.

88% of the respondents agreed that violence against women was widespread in Turkey, a convergence to observe. Yet, party supporters differ in their responses about who should assume the major responsibility to mitigate violence against women:

- According to HDP (85%), CHP (74%) and İYİ Party (77%) supporters the responsibility rested with the government. 60% of the AK Party and MHP supporters were among those who believed the government should be responsible.
- Supporters of AK Party (57%), MHP (55%) and İYİ Party (50%) also considered families to be responsible.
- 35% of CHP supporters and 28% of MHP supporters held the education system responsible.

Important convergences were also observed when asked whether the responsible institution exert sufficient effort to fulfill its part:

- 59% of AK Party supporters and 44% of MHP supporters thought that the responsible individuals or institutions were doing their parts to mitigate the violence against women.
- According to the supporters of HDP (86%), CHP (85%) and İYİ Party (82%), those responsible were not doing their part.

**Party Supporters are Divided in Terms of Values Too:**

The research study also demonstrated that there were significant differences among party supporters in terms of some values.
85% of AK Party supporters and 77% of MHP supporters thought that religious education should be mandatory in primary education. This rate varies among other parties between 60% and 50%.

71% of AK Party supporters agreed with the view that "religion is always right, even if it contradicts with science". This rate was 51% among MHP supporters and 31% among CHP supporters.

The approval rate among AKP Party supporters for the view "if the mother works, the children will suffer" was 61%. This rate was 39% among İYİ Party supporters and 35% among CHP supporters.

62% of AK Party supporters agreed with the view that "if a person is religious, s/he will also be ethical". This rate was 27% among CHP supporters.

While 57% of AK Party supporters believed that, if it was not easy to find jobs in the country, men deserved to work more than the women, those who approved this view among CHP and İYİ Party supporters was 31%.

While 51% of CHP supporters argue that the theory of evolution should be taught in primary education, this rate is 33% among AK Party supporters.

The survey findings measured different opinions regarding the functioning of economy and the responsibilities of the government by different party supporters.

66% of AK Party, MHP and İYİ Party supporters agreed that economic differences would encourage people to work.

Meanwhile, this rate was 56% among CHP and HDP supporters.

On the other hand, it is possible to say that there was a consensus on the view that discrepancies in the life standards of people should be minimal in an equitable society.

22% of the respondents expressed willingness to settle in another country other than Turkey in the coming days. This rate was 44% among HDP supporters and 31% among CHP supporters whereas 9% of AK Party supporters and 14% of MHP supporters responded positively. The limited job opportunities in the country (64%), concern about not having a future in the country (26%) and limitations on individual freedoms (26%) were among the factors that push the participants to settle abroad.

Foreign Policy Perceptions:

Despite all the differences of opinions and values, there are some common grounds especially about the foreign policy.

Azerbaijan was considered to be Turkey's biggest partner with 49%. This response was given by 40% or above among all party supporters (MHP 64% and AK Party 55%) except the HDP supporters.

While Russia (11%) ranked second, the percentage of those who answered “none” was 8%.
• When the participants were asked which country was the biggest threat for Turkey, 48% responded as the United States, and except for HDP (39%), there was not a significant difference among other party supporters.
• Israel was regarded as second biggest threat with 12% and all the part supporters agreed on this.

We can say that some opinion differences existed among the party supporters regarding how the international order should be maintained:

• AKP (64%) and MHP (71%) supporters supported the use of military force when it was necessary to protect its interests in the international arena. The support rate among CHP and HDP supporters was 36%.
• 51% of MHP supporters and 43% of AK Party supporters believed securing peace was best possible primarily by military force. 66-70% of CHP and İYİ Party supporters believed that negotiations were a better method.

When asked about a possible referendum on Turkey’s full membership to EU, 50% of MHP supporters and 42% of AK Party supporters declared they would vote “no”. Percentage of “yes” votes among İYİ Party, HDP and CHP were 52%, 62% and 65%, respectively. Percentage of AK Party and HDP supporters who would vote “yes” were 43% and 35%, respectively.

Another issue that was agreed upon by the supporters of different parties was the Sévres Syndrome, which represents the belief that Western countries are in efforts to divide Turkey. We found out that:

• 79% of the respondents thought that European countries supported separatist organizations such as PKK,
• 79% of the respondents thought that European countries were in efforts to divide and disintegrate Turkey,
• 67% of the respondents thought that the "Crusader Spirit" still existed,
• 64% of the respondents thought that reforms that were required by the EU as part of the Accession Process were not different from capitulations,
• 64% of the respondents thought that Westernization efforts were not going beyond imitation,
• and 58% of the respondents thought that the reforms requested from Turkey were not different from Sévres Treaty.

Sévres Syndrome index, which was calculated in the light of the responses given to the questions, we suspect that on a scale varying from 1 to 4, every party supporter has a value around 3 or above. This value reaches to 3.5 among AK Party and MHP supporters. This shows how the Sévres Syndrome forms a common ground.

**Fight Against Coronavirus:**

The level of impact of the Coronavirus pandemic, which profoundly affected our country, on political polarization is another point where this research study focused on. When asked about the
Coronavirus measures, most of the respondents stated that they complied, and percentage of the positive responses ranged between 80% and 90%. The index calculated for the compliance with the Coronavirus measures shows that there is no difference between different party supporters. Unlike other countries, we can say that there is no partisan differentiation in this regard.

On the other hand, we observe that different party supporters rely on different sources of information about Coronavirus. While AK Party and MHP supporters trusted the statements coming from the Ministry of Health, CHP supporters found the World Health Organization, Turkish Medical Association, and the experts they know more reliable.

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